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Abstract
This paper first examines some recent exchange rate classification schemes. There is
little evidence of a trend towards greater agreement between schemes. There is a
probability of between 16 and 28% that a peg in one classification scheme is coded
as a float in a different scheme, or vice versa. This probability is much smaller for the
tightest forms of peg and the most volatile floats. Continuous indices of exchange rate
flexibility are analysed and shown to have significant potential, despite the lack of
interest in them shown in previous research.
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1 Introduction
Since the 1990s, when it was recognised that central banks had sometimes been
misreporting their exchange rate regimes, there has been intensive work on finding new
methods of classification (e.g. Ghosh et al. 2002; Klein and Shambaugh 2010; Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger 2005; Reinhart and Rogoff 2004; Shambaugh 2004). This
research has almost entirely followed the path of defining a number of “fine”
(disaggregated) or “coarse” (aggregated) categories to which to allocate each observation,
rather than develop a numerical measure of exchange rate flexibility. Although Ghosh
et al. (2002, pp. 49–51) suggest a simple numerical flexibility index, theymake no use of it
except to define three categories of regime (pegged, intermediate and floating). Reviews of
this research effort in the classification of exchange rate regimes have generally concluded
that it has been unsatisfactory, at least in so far as that is measured by the degree of
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agreement between alternative schemes (Bleaney et al. 2017; Eichengreen and Razo-
Garcia 2013; Tavlas et al. 2008). The purpose of the present paper is twofold: to
investigate whether this remains true of the more recent classification efforts, and to assess
the value of numerical alternatives.
The recent exchange rate regime classifications that we consider are those of Ilzetzki
et al. (2017), Obstfeld et al. (2010) and Bleaney and Tian (2017), together with
numerical measures of exchange rate flexibility associated with the last two. Ilzetzki
et al. (2017) have updated the Reinhart-Rogoff classification up to 2016 without
amending the classification algorithm in any way. Obstfeld et al. (2010) have relaxed
the rather stringent definitions of a peg used by Shambaugh (2004) and Klein and
Shambaugh (2010) to be more in line with other classifications, and the data have been
updated to 2014. Bleaney and Tian (2017) have suggested a method of measuring
exchange rate flexibility and identifying exchange rate regimes by a regression similar
to that previously used by Frankel and Wei (1995) and Slavov (2013) to identify the
basket of anchor currencies for a pegged regime. For the purposes of this paper we have
updated the data to 2017.
All of these classification schemes are designed to capture how much variation is
permitted about a defined central rate, if one exists, but they have different ways of
answering that question. In an ideal world, the different approaches would make little
difference in practice, and the outcomes would be similar. Unfortunately, as we show,
that remains far from true.
Section 2 discusses the classification schemes, and Section 3 compares the outcomes
on a country-year basis back to 1980. In Section 4, biases caused by regime changes are
discussed. Section 5 investigates continuous measures of exchange rate flexibility.
Further issues are discussed in Section 6, and Section 7 concludes.
2 The Classifications
We shall be concerned here with classification systems designed to cover a large
number of countries over a considerable period, whose output is then available for
addressing a variety of research questions about the impact of the choice of
exchange rate regime. Any system for classifying exchange rate regimes needs to
address a number of issues, such as the following: (a) is it to be based on purely
statistical analysis, or should it take account of other information such as stated
government policy or the assessment of informed observers, which would involve
a considerably more intensive research effort? (b) How disaggregated should the
classification aim to be? (c) How many months’ data should be used to define the
regime (there is obviously a trade-off here between accuracy and the possibility of
regime change during the period)? (d) What are the critical issues: is it whether the
nominal exchange rate is strictly constant or not, and should it be an exchange rate
against a single currency or possibly a currency basket? How should the occasional
parity change be dealt with?
If these questions are answered differently in the construction of different classifi-
cation systems, clearly the outcomes will differ. How important those differences turn
out to be cannot be answered in the abstract, but only in practice. In the next section we
compare in some detail the outcomes for different classification schemes.
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The schemes that we compare are the updated Reinhart-Rogoff scheme of Ilzetzki
et al. (2017) [hereafter IRR], the updated Shambaugh classification and a modified
version of the Bleaney-Tian (2017) method. We compare these schemes with each
other and with the IMF de facto classification.
The Reinhart-Rogoff method uses a combination of detailed chronologies and
statistical methods. If the authorities announce some form of peg, statistical analysis
is used to confirm that over the relevant period. If no peg is announced, rolling five-
year periods are used to define the regime, based on whether 80% of the monthly
absolute percentage changes in the exchange rate against the identified anchor currency
fall within a limited range (1 % for a peg). If no peg or band as wide as ±5% is
identified, the regime is defined as either a managed or an independent float, depending
on the degree of exchange rate volatility. Because the statistical analysis is based on
five years rather than one, regime switches are much rarer in IRR than in the other
classifications.1
The updated Shambaugh classification (hereafter referred to as OST) uses the
definition of a peg introduced by Obstfeld et al. (2010). Shambaugh (2004)
used a strict definition of a peg, according to which a currency either moved by
less than 2 % in any month relative to an identified anchor currency, or (to
allow for parity changes) was absolutely fixed for eleven months out of twelve,
but could have any size of movement in the remaining month. The OST
classification also allows for soft pegs that do not meet either of these criteria
for a strict peg, but stay within a band of up to ±5%. In addition the OST
classification has a category labelled “Single-Year Pegs”, that meet the criteria
for a peg in year T, but not in year T-1 or year T + 1. These “Single-Year Pegs”
are coded as floats in the OST system, on the grounds that such episodes are
more likely to be floats that are undergoing a period of temporary stability than
genuine pegs.
The Bleaney-Tian (2017) method [hereafter referred to as BT] requires the identi-
fication of a numeraire currency. Previous research has often used the Swiss franc as the
numeraire currency, but in the last few years the Swiss franc has not always been
floating freely, so here we modify the method by using the Japanese yen as a numeraire
instead. The potential anchor currencies that we consider are the US dollar and the euro,
but with others added in particular cases as listed in Bleaney and Tian (2017, p. 304).
Up to 1998, when the euro had not yet been created, we use the German mark and the
French franc instead. The regression relates exchange rate movements of currency i
against the chosen numeraire currency N (in this case the Japanese yen) to movements
of potential anchor currencies against N:
ΔlnE i;Nð Þt ¼ aþ bΔlnE USD;Nð Þt þ cΔlnE EUR;Nð Þt þ ut ð1Þ
where USD is the US dollar, EUR is the euro, E(i, N) is the number of units of currency
i per yen, and Δ is the first-difference operator. In a single-currency peg to the euro, the
euro-yen exchange rate should have a coefficient equal to one, and any other exchange
1 See Reinhart and Rogoff (2004, Appendix) for details. If the rolling five-year data yield a different result for
years T to T + 4 to that for years T + 1 to T + 5, presumably it is the result for the later period that is used for
the overlapping years T + 1 to T + 4, although this is not explicitly stated.
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rate should have a coefficient of zero. In a basket peg, the coefficients of the currencies
making up the basket should sum to one. If the government operates a crawling peg,
with a steady devaluation rate of x% per month, the value of x can be estimated from
the intercept term in the regression.
The classification is based on the root mean square error (RMSE) of this regression,
which we shall call Regression A. To allow for the possibility of one parity change per
year, Bleaney and Tian (2017) estimate 12 extra regressions, each with a dummy
variable equal to one in one month only added to Regression A. Call these regressions
B(1) to B(12). If none of the dummy variables is statistically significant enough,
Regressions B(1) to B(12) are ignored, and that country-year is coded a Fix if RMSE
<0.01, and a Float otherwise. If any of the dummy variables is significant enough, the B
regression with the most significant dummy variable becomes the focus of attention.2 If
the RMSE <0.01 in the chosen B regression, that country-year is coded as a Peg with a
Parity Change, and otherwise a Float. We impose two exceptions to this rule, however.
(1) If the estimated parity change is very small (< ±0.02), we treat it as a movement
within an unchanged band rather than a shift in the central rate, and the observation is
coded a Fix. (2) Since revaluations are in practice rare, except where one is known to
have occurred, if the estimated parity change is a revaluation of >0.02, this is assumed
to be spurious, and the B regressions are ignored, the coding instead being based on
Regression A.3 This classification is available up to 2017.
Finally, the IMF de facto classification is based on IMF country desks’ perception of
the regime in force at the time, according to defined criteria. It identifies a number of
different types of peg or band, a managed float and an independent float. Since 2012,
the IMF has changed its approach, so this classification is available only up to 2011.
It is reasonable to hypothesise that the primary reason for managing a floating
exchange rate is to reduce its volatility (see Frankel 2019, for some evidence). In order
to create some symmetry between the classifications that distinguish between managed
and independent floats and those that do not, we make use of a continuous measure of
exchange rate flexibility to distinguish high-volatility from low-volatility floats in the
latter. In the BT system, the RMSE from the regression on which the classification is
decided is that measure. Floats are deemed to be high-volatility if RMSE >0.02, and
low-volatility otherwise. For the OST system, the dataset provides a slightly different
flexibility measure, named EVOL, which is the standard deviation of monthly propor-
tional changes in the exchange rate against the identified anchor currency. A similar
criterion is applied: if EVOL >0.02, it is a high-volatility float; otherwise it is a low-
volatility float. One of the main differences between RMSE and EVOL is that the size
of any parity change in the year will tend to affect EVOL but not RMSE, since in the
latter case it will have been captured by the dummy variable in the regression.
Table 1 summarises the categories used for each classification scheme in the
subsequent analysis.4
2 Bleaney and Tian (2017) suggest an F-statistic >30 for the addition of the dummy variable as the critical
value.
3 We treat Germany 1983 and China 2005 as genuine parity changes.
4 The sources of regime classification data are https://www2.gwu.edu/~iiep/about/faculty/jshambaugh/data.
cfm; http://www.carmenreinhart.com/data/browse-by-topic/topics/11/; and [information suppressed to
preserve author anonymity].
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3 Comparisons Between Classifications
Table 2 summarises the pairwise comparisons between our four schemes, using
the regime categories shown in Table 1 (for a more disaggregated presentation,
see Appendix Tables 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17). For each regime category, the
table shows the percentage of country-years which are in that category in one
classification scheme that are classified as some form of float by each of the
other three. For example the top row of Table 2 shows that, of the 3440 BT
Fixes in the first column of Appendix Table 12, 12.8% were classified by the
IMF as a managed or independent float. The other two figures in the first row
of Table 2 show that a similar proportion of BT fixes (12.2% and 8.1%) were
classified as floats in the other two classifications.
The second row of Table 2 shows the proportion of floats identified by the other
classifications when BT identifies a peg with a parity change. For IMF and IRR, this
proportion is still quite low, at 17.7% and 26.7% respectively, but for OST it is much
higher, at 49.0%. The third row shows the figures for BT Low-Volatility Floats, which
in other classifications are fairly evenly split between pegs and floats (the proportion of
floats is 59.4%, 47.6% and 48.1% for IMF, IRR and OST respectively). Finally, in the
fourth row of Table 2, we see that there is a heavy majority of floats in other
classifications when the BT classification is a High-Volatility Float (76.2% for IMF,
68.8% for IRR and 90.1% for OST).
Thus the clear pattern in the top panel of Table 2, which compares each other
classification in turn with the BT classification, is that there is much more likely to be
agreement in the case of the more extreme regimes; for intermediate regimes, the
disagreements are quite numerous.
Table 1 Summary of categories used in each classification
Classification Peg/Band Float
BT Fix
Peg with parity change
Low-volatility float
High-volatility float
IMF Hard peg
Conventional peg
Basket peg
Band
Crawl
Managed float
Independent float
IRR Peg (1–4)
Crawl (5–8)
Wide moving band/managed float (9–12)
Free float (13)
OST Strict peg
Other peg
Single-year peg
Low-volatility float
High-volatility float
In the BT system, a high-volatility float is defined as RMSE>0.02. In the IRR system, the numbers refer to the
disaggregated classification (Ilzetzki et al. 2017, Table 2); categories 1–4 are a de jure or de facto horizontal
peg; categories 5–8 are a crawling band up to ±2%; categories 9 to 12 are a moving band wider than ±2% or a
managed float. In the OST system, a strict peg conforms to the Shambaugh (2004) definition, and “other peg”
is one that meets the definition of a soft peg in Obstfeld et al. (2010); a single-year peg is an observation that
satisfies the criteria for a peg but one that lasts for a single year only, and is therefore reclassified as a float; a
high-volatility float is defined as EVOL>0.02
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The other panels of Table 2 repeat the exercise for the other three classifications. The
general pattern is the same. There is a high degree of agreement (greater than 90%) in
the case of the tightest form of peg, and a reasonably high one (always greater than
60%) for the more extreme form of floating, but much less so for intermediate regimes.
Managed or low-volatility floats in one classification tend to be coded as pegs in any
alternative classification in about 50% of cases. For pegs other than the tightest form,
there is generally a solid but not overwhelming majority of pegs in the comparison
classification; for IRR Crawls the proportion of floats is 31.6% (BT), 42.0 % (IMF) and
27.7% (OST); for OST Other Pegs the proportion of floats is 38.4% (BT), 45.0% (IMF)
and 30.4% (IRR); and for IMF Pegs there is a clear difference between Conventional
Pegs, which other classifications almost always identify as pegs (91.5% for BT, 84.9%
for IRR and 92.2% for OST), and Basket Pegs, Bands and Crawls which are consid-
erably more likely to be identified as floats in the comparison classification (the
percentages of floats range from 19 to 53%).
In the OST classification, Single-Year Pegs are coded as floats. It can be seen from
Table 2 that they tend not to be coded as floats in the other classifications. In the BT
Table 2 Percentages of floats in each pairwise comparison
IMF IRR OST
BT Fix 12.8 12.2 8.1
BT Parity Change 17.7 26.7 49.0
BT LV Float 59.4 47.6 48.1
BT HV Float 76.2 68.8 90.1
BT IMF OST
IRR Peg 3.3 3.8 3.2
IRR Crawl 31.6 42.0 27.7
IRR Man. Float 56.9 49.2 51.8
IRR Free Float 86.0 75.7 90.2
BT IMF IRR
OST Strict Peg 1.5 6.3 7.2
OST Other Peg 38.4 45.0 30.4
OST Single-Yr Peg 11.7 38.0 24.7
OST LV Float 49.9 40.9 50.3
OST HV Float 82.9 61.5 63.2
BT IRR OST
IMF Hard Peg 1.2 3.0 1.7
IMF Conv. Peg 8.5 15.1 7.8
IMF Basket Peg 19.8 40.6 38.8
IMF Band 25.5 19.3 25.5
IMF Crawl 35.1 29.5 52.6
IMF Man. Float 60.5 33.9 51.4
IMF Indep. Float 85.7 73.8 64.5
The table shows the percentage of the row classification that is coded as some type of float in the column
classification, based on the figures in Tables 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17. LV: low-volatility; HV: high-volatility
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classification only 11.7% of these observations are floats; the figure for the IMF
classification is 38.0%, and for the IRR classification it is 24.7%. The low figure for
IRR is particularly striking, because one would expect that temporarily rather stable
floats would still come out as floats in the IRR classification, because of its reliance on
five-year rolling windows rather than twelve-month windows. This may in part reflect
the reluctance of IRR to identify a free float, a feature which we have previously
attributed to their decision to treat particularly high-volatility bilateral exchange rate
pairs as typical of the volatility of free floats in general (Bleaney et al. 2017).
For the sake of completeness, Tables 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 in the Appendix show
a fully disaggregated version of this comparison for each pair of schemes. For example
Table 12 shows the number of country-years with a given IMF classification that fall
within each of the BT classifications.
Looking at Table 2 as a whole, there are a few striking disagreements. One is that
where a peg with a parity change is identified by the BT classification, a particularly
high proportion of cases (51.7%) are classified by OST as floats (and the vast majority
as high-volatility floats, as Table 14 shows), compared with 18.8% and 28.4% in the
IMF and IRR classifications respectively. This reflects the fact that parity changes are
often too big to stay within the ±5% criterion used by OST for a soft peg, whereas other
classifications do not impose such a restriction on the size of a parity change in a
pegged regime. For a similar reason, where the IMF classification identifies a crawl,
this is classified as a float by OSTon 52.6% of occasions, compared with 35.1% for BT
and 29.5% for IRR (Table 17). The focus of the IRR and OST algorithms on single-
currency pegs, rather than possible basket pegs, is reflected in the fact that IMF basket
pegs are classified as floats 40.6% of the time by IRR and 38.8% of the time by OST,
compared with only 18.8% for BT.
Table 3 shows the aggregate disagreement rate between each pair of schemes, based
on the figures in Tables 12 to 17. A disagreement is registered when one of the pairs
codes a form of peg or band and the other codes a form of float. The BT classification
has a disagreement rate of between 16 and 21% with each of the other three schemes,
whereas the disagreement rate between the other three is always somewhat higher
(27.2% for IMF/IRR, 27.6% for IMF/OST and 22.7% for IRR/OST). Whether one
should conclude from these figures that the BT classification is in some sense better
than the others is not entirely clear.
Table 3 Aggregate percentage disagreement rate (Float/non-float)
BT IMF IRR OST
BT x
IMF 18.7 x
IRR 20.3 27.2 x
OST 16.2 27.6 22.7 x
Average 18.4 24.5 23.2 23.0
Statistics derived from Tables 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17. A disagreement is registered if a country-year is coded
as a type of peg or band by one classification and a type of float by the other. Single-year pegs in the OST
system are counted as floats
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4 Regime Changes
Regime changes during the period are obviously going to distort the results of any
classification based on purely statistical data. In any regression analysis, any structural
change tends to worsen the fit. Deciding whether an exchange rate regime is a peg or a
float is largely based on the idea that the exchange rate is more predictable under a peg;
any regime switch will reduce that predictability, and one would therefore expect that
regime switches would make a float classification more likely. In Tables 4 and 5 we
separate the comparison between the BT classification and the IMF classification
shown in Table 12 into cases where the IMF regime is the same in year T as in year
T-1 (Table 4) and cases where it is not (Table 5).5
In Table 4 (no regime change) there are a total of 782 cases out of 4567 (17.1%)
where the BT classification is some type of float when the IMF classification is a peg or
band, or vice versa. In Table 5 (regime change) the disagreements of this sort amount to
208 cases out of 728 (28.6%), substantially higher than in Table 4. We can further
separate these disagreements into cases where an IMF float is a BT peg and vice versa.
In Tables 4, 430 out of 1307 IMF floats (31.1%) are BT pegs, whereas in Table 5 this
proportion is actually lower (78 out of 2876, or 27.3%). If we look at IMF pegs that are
BT floats, however, we get very much the opposite picture: there are 375 out of 3260
such cases in Table 4 (11.5%), and 130 out of 462 such cases in Table 5 (28.1%). So a
switch of IMF regime makes a BT peg classification less likely but a BT float
classification more likely. This confirms the conjecture that regime switches tend to
bias statistical measures towards greater exchange rate flexibility.
5 Continuous Measures of Exchange Rate Flexibility
Two of the classification schemes that we have been considering offer continuous
measures of exchange rate flexibility. In each case there tend to be some outliers at the
upper end, so any statistics that we report refer to the median or percentiles rather than
the mean of these measures, and in any regression, each measure is trimmed at the
upper end by dropping the highest 2 % of observations. In the BT classification, the
RMSE itself is a natural measure of flexibility relative to the estimated central rate,
which may be a constant, or undergo one step change (if the B regressions are being
used) and/or be subject to a trend. In the OST dataset, data are given for the standard
deviation of the proportional rate of change of the nominal exchange rate against the
identified anchor currency (EVOL). This allows for a trend, which would emerge in the
mean rather than the standard deviation, but unlike RMSE EVOL will be affected by a
step change in the central rate.6
Table 6 shows the median value of these two statistics (each multiplied by 100) for
each regime classification. In the first column RMSE has a steady gradation from zero
or close to it for the tightest peg, up to the highest value for an independent or high-
5 Since the IMF classification is essentially an observation at a point in time (at the end of the year), a change
in the classification since the previous year tends to indicate a change of regime during the year.
6 EVOL is quite similar to the z-statistic suggested by Ghosh et al. (2002), which is equal to the square root of
the sum of the square of the mean rate of monthly depreciation against the anchor currency and its variance.
The difference is that EVOL takes no account of the mean.
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volatility float. In the second column EVOL shows a similar pattern but with two
exceptions. For a BT Peg with Parity Change, its median is 3.323, which is consider-
ably higher than for a Low-Volatility Float. This is because a parity change affects the
value of EVOL. The other classification where EVOL seems out of line with RMSE is
an IMF Basket Peg, where the EVOL median value of 1.556 is well above the value for
a Band or a Crawl, and almost as large as for an IMF Managed Float. This presumably
reflects the fact that the OST algorithm searches for single-currency pegs only, and not
basket pegs.
More detailed information about the distribution of RMSE and EVOL, including the
quintiles of the distribution, are given in Appendix Table 18. To test the statistical
significance of the differences in RMSE and EVOL across regime classifications,
Table 7 shows some regression analysis of each numerical index (multiplied by 100)
on the regime dummies for the IMF classification. The numerical indices are trimmed
at the upper end (2 %), and the regressions include country and year dummies. The
Table 4 BT/IMF comparison 1980–2011 with no IMF regime change t-1 to t
BT classification
Fix Peg with parity change Low-Vol. Float High-Vol. Float Total
IMF classification:
Hard peg 992 13 5 0 1010
Conventional peg 902 75 24 37 1038
Basket peg 333 43 69 25 470
Band 191 10 48 8 257
Crawl 307 19 98 61 485
Managed Float 310 27 231 252 820
Independent Float 66 4 149 268 487
Total 3101 191 624 651 4567
Table 5 BT/IMF comparison 1980–2011 with IMF regime change t-1 to t
BT classification
Fix Peg with parity change Low-Vol. Float High-Vol. Float Total
IMF classification:
Hard peg 45 1 1 7 54
Conventional peg 125 14 15 28 182
Basket peg 37 9 3 7 56
Band 19 5 11 10 45
Crawl 47 10 19 29 105
Managed Float 56 10 30 103 199
Independent Float 10 2 18 57 87
Total 339 51 97 241 728
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omitted category is a hard peg, so the coefficients show the difference in mean RMSE
between the relevant category and a hard peg. In Column (1), the mean RMSE for
conventional and basket pegs is about half the value for crawls and bands, which are in
turn quite a bit smaller than managed floats, with independent floats having the highest
value. At the foot of Table 7, two p-values are shown, one for the test that the
coefficients of bands and managed floats are equal, and one for the test of equality
between the coefficients of managed and independent floats. Both p-values in Column
(1) are 0.000, indicating that independent floats have significantly higher RMSE on
average than managed floats, which in turn have significantly higher RMSE than
bands.
Column (2) shows a similar regression for EVOL. The pattern is similar, except for
the rather high coefficient for basket pegs, and the p-values are both significant at the
0.05 level. A second significant feature is that the t-statistics in Table 7 are in most
cases about twice as large for BT RMSE as for EVOL, which indicates that the RMSE
measure is much more consistent for a given regime than the EVOL measure, because
its standard error is about half as large. Finally Column (3) shows that the coefficients
for RMSE and EVOL are not significantly different from one another in most cases,
with the exception of basket pegs.
Table 6 Continuous measures of exchange rate flexibility
100 times median value of
BT RMSE OST EVOL
BT Fix 0.000 0.000
BT Parity Change 0.016 3.323
BT LV Float 1.360 1.677
BT HV Float 3.073 3.820
IRR Peg 0.000 0.000
IRR Crawl 0.571 1.096
IRR Man. Float 1.169 1.801
IRR Free Float 1.856 3.038
OST Strict Peg 0.000 0.000
OST Other Peg 0.760 1.294
OST Single-Yr Peg 0.518 0.758
OST LV Float 0.984 1.488
OST HV Float 2.372 3.831
IMF Hard Peg 0.000 0.000
IMF Conv. Peg 0.000 0.000
IMF Basket Peg 0.371 1.556
IMF Band 0.588 1.001
IMF Crawl 0.543 1.148
IMF Man. Float 1.171 1.740
IMF Indep. Float 1.939 2.414
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Overall, these regression results suggest that BT RMSE in particular is a satisfactory
index of exchange rate flexibility that captures what classification schemes are designed
to achieve: regimes that are generally thought of as more flexible have significantly
higher flexibility measures on average. For EVOL, that is also true except for basket pegs.
Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 illustrate the evolution of RMSE and EVOL since 1995 for a
selection of countries. Figure 1 shows that China was narrowly pegged between 1997
and 2004, after which it shifted to a somewhat more flexible regime. Figure 2 demon-
strates that RMSE tends to be quite a bit smaller than EVOL for a basket-pegging
country such as Fiji. Figures. 3 and 4 show RMSE and EVOL for two floating
countries: Canada and Australia. These graphs show that RMSE tends to be more
stable over time, and both measures tend to be higher for Australia, which is more
distant from its main trading partners than Canada.
We might also ask what would happen if we used a numerical index of flexibility
instead of the standard classification dummy variables in empirical applications. Here
we take a very simple example: whether the world has been moving towards greater
exchange rate flexibility up to 2000, and since. We first do this for our flexibility
indices, and then for a float dummy from each classification scheme, based on the
categories in Table 1, that is equal to one for a float and zero for a peg or band. The
Table 7 Comparing Flexibility Measures by IMF Regimes (Fixed Effects Regressions)
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: BT RMSE OST EVOL RMSE minus EVOL
IMF Conv. Peg 0.292*** 0.408 −0.076
(2.68) (1.05) (−0.26)
IMF Basket Peg 0.465*** 1.078*** −0.753**
(3.23) (2.60) (−2.24)
IMF Band 0.735*** 1.040*** −0.299
(6.47) (2.74) (−1.01)
IMF Crawl 0.546*** 0.826* −0.301
(3.75) (1.91) (−0.84)
IMF Managed Float 1.295*** 1.821*** −0.137
(10.27) (4.45) (−0.45)
IMF Independent Float 1.813*** 2.549*** −0.281
(11.99) (5.32) (−0.88)
Currency Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
No. Currencies 179 173 171
No. Observations 5099 5034 4880
R-squared 0.31 0.14 0.04
p-Val. Band =Mng. Float 0.000 0.023 0.543
p-Val. Mng. Float = Ind. Float 0.000 0.013 0.469
RMSE 0.961 2.681 2.203
RMSE and EVOL are trimmed at the top 2% and multiplied by 100. Heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics in
parentheses. ***, **, * significant at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively
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results are shown in Table 8 for the flexibility indices and Table 9 for the float
dummies.
In Table 8 results are presented both for pooled OLS and for currency fixed effects.
The results are very similar. For BT RMSE, there is a positive trend, which is
significant at the 0.01 level, up to the year 1999, and a slight negative trend (significant
at 0.05 with currency fixed effects but not without) since, suggesting that the late
twentieth-century trend towards greater exchange rate flexibility has been reversed
during the twenty-first century. For OST EVOL, the picture is rather different: a slightly
negative but insignificant trend up to 1999, and a rather fast and highly significant
downward trend since.
Fig. 1 Exchange rate flexibility measures: China
Fig. 2 Exchange rate flexibility measures: Fiji
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In Table 9, the float dummies in the IMF and BT classifications show a
pattern similar to that of BT RMSE, of increasing flexibility up to 1999 and
decreasing flexibility thereafter. For IRR, the trend is slightly negative in both
periods but not statistically significant, and for OST there is a strong negative
trend from 2000 onwards and an insignificant one before that, which is similar
to the results for OST EVOL.
Bleaney et al. (2016) find, in particular, that inflation rates up to a level of 25% p.a.
are highly significant in the choice of exchange rate regime, with higher inflation being
associated with a greater likelihood of floating, and have argued that time trends in
Fig. 3 Exchange rate flexibility measures: Canada
Fig. 4 Exchange rate flexibility measures: Australia
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regime choice should control for this effect. They argue that the apparent increase in
popularity of pegging in the twenty-first century is largely a result of falling inflation
rates rather than an increased preference for pegging at a given inflation rate. For
versions of the regressions in Tables 8 and 9 that control for this inflation effect, see
Bleaney and Tian (2019).
Table 8 Time trends of exchange rate flexibilities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pooled OLS Currency Fixed Effects
Dependent variable: BT RMSE OST EVOL BT RMSE OST EVOL
1 (Year<=1999) * 0.017*** −0.012 0.015*** −0.015*
(Year-2000) (4.03) (−1.34) (3.52) (−1.67)
1 (Year>1999)* −0.007* −0.054*** −0.009** −0.055***
(Year-2000) (−1.87) (−5.16) (−2.17) (−5.11)
Constant 0.807*** 1.701*** 0.806*** 1.689***
(11.98) (13.30) (23.64) (23.65)
No. Currencies 211 177
No. Observations 7116 5708 7116 5708
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
RMSE 1.201 3.036 0.965 2.663
Standard errors are clustered at currency-level. 1(.) represents an indicator function taking the value of one if
the condition holds and zero otherwise
Table 9 OLS: time trends of floats
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: IRR IMF BT OST
1 (Year<=1999) * −0.002 0.020*** 0.006*** −0.002
(Year-2000) (−1.05) (9.14) (3.92) (−1.16)
1 (Year>1999)* −0.002 −0.006** −0.003** −0.008***
(Year-2000) (−0.90) (−2.06) (−2.17) (−4.14)
Constant 0.226*** 0.435*** 0.319*** 0.301***
(7.95) (12.27) (12.28) (11.41)
No. Observations 6357 5349 7345 5829
R-squared 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.01
RMSE 0.420 0.442 0.445 0.450
Standard errors are clustered at currency-level. The dependent variables are equal to one where the classifi-
cation identifies a float (see Table 1) and zero where it does not
IRR Floats =Mng. + Free Floats
IMF Floats =Mng. + Indp. Floats
BT Floats = BT L-&H-Vol Floats
OST Floats = OST L-&H-Vol Floats
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6 Other Information in the Classifications
In the BT classification, there are other statistics that one might consider. The intercept
of the regression provides an estimate of the trend in the central rate. In the B
regressions, the coefficient of the dummy variable provides an estimate of the size of
the parity change. Here, however, we focus on another statistic: the coefficients of the
exchange rates themselves. What do they reveal about the choice of exchange rate
anchors?
In Table 10 we tabulate, for observations coded in the BT system as some
form of peg, the number of cases in which an exchange rate coefficient is
greater than 0.9 (suggesting a single-currency peg), and the number of cases
where there is no exchange rate coefficient greater than 0.9, by IMF regime,
because that is the most disaggregated classification. It is clear that most pegs
Table 10 Distribution of exchange rate coefficients for BT pegs by IMF regime 1980–2011
Count of exchange rate coefficient > 0.9
US$ Euro Other None
IMF classification:
Hard peg 334 651 61 5
Conventional peg 798 129 136 54
Basket peg 18 29 4 372
Band 15 98 1 111
Crawl 225 22 1 135
Managed float 254 26 0 130
Independent float 50 15 0 17
Total 1694 970 203 824
Table 11 Distribution of exchange rate coefficients for BT pegs by IRR regime 1980–2016
Count of exchange rate coefficient > 0.9
US$ Euro Other None
IRR classification:
Peg (1–5) 1272 1060 197 186
Crawl (6–9) 566 91 16 520
Wide moving band/ managed float (10–12) 219 35 38 261
Free float (13) 5 16 0 3
Freely falling 97 2 0 22
Parallel market data missing 60 7 4 10
Total 2219 1211 255 1002
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or bands are single-currency pegs to the US dollar or to the euro, except in the
case of those classified by the IMF as Basket Pegs, for which 372 out of 423
cases (87.9%) have no exchange rate coefficient greater than 0.9, as one would
expect for a basket peg. This result may be interpreted as statistical confirma-
tion of these cases as basket pegs. About two-thirds (274 out of 404) of IMF
Managed Floats show strong attachment to a single currency, which in 90% of
cases is the US dollar.
Table 11 provides a similar tabulation for BT pegs by IRR regime. If the
IRR classification is a peg, then the overwhelming likelihood is that the BT
regression results suggest that it is a single-currency peg. If the IRR classifi-
cation is a Crawl or a Wide Moving Band/Managed Float, then the chance of a
BT exchange rate coefficient being greater than 0.9 is not that much above 50%
(673/1203 = 55.9% for crawls, and 294/555 = 52.9% for Managed Floats). This
figure is lower for Managed Floats than in the IMF classification, possibly
because it includes some IMF Basket Pegs.
7 Conclusion
It is not easy to classify exchange rate regimes into a number of discrete
categories, or to develop a satisfactory continuous measure of exchange rate
flexibility. Different classification schemes are not showing any signs of con-
verging towards agreement, because there has been little convergence on ap-
proaches to some fundamental issues, such as how much to rely on purely
statistical methods, how long a time span over which to measure the regime
and how much allowance to make for basket pegs and parity changes. The BT
and OST classifications depend entirely on statistical algorithms, and the IRR
classification largely does so, whereas the IMF de facto classification might be
described as a judgement by well-informed observers backed up by statistical
information. Strictly speaking, a regime exists at a point in time, but the
relevant statistics can only be calculated over a certain time span, which is a
year in the case of BT and OST, but somewhat longer for IRR. It has been
shown here, by comparing country-years with and without a regime change
according to the IMF classification, that regime changes tend to bias statistical
methods towards greater flexibility. Whereas the BT and IMF classifications can
identify basket pegs, OST and IRR focus solely on single-currency pegs, and
our results suggest that they tend to mis-classify basket pegs as a result.
Provided sizeable parity changes are infrequent, they are treated as compatible
with a peg status in BT, IMF and IRR, but in many cases not so in OST.
Previous literature has not taken continuous measures of exchange rate flexibility
seriously. Our results suggest that they deserve more attention. Particularly in the case
of the BT RMSE measure, they show the expected relationship to discrete classifica-
tions, and with considerable consistency.
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Appendix
Table 12 Comparison between BT and IMF classifications 1980–2011
BT classification
Fix Peg with parity change Low-Vol. Float High-Vol. Float Total
IMF classification:
Hard peg 1037 14 6 7 1064
Conventional peg 1027 89 39 65 1220
Basket peg 370 52 72 32 526
Band 210 15 59 18 302
Crawl 354 29 117 90 590
Managed Float 366 37 261 355 1019
Izndependent Float 76 6 167 325 574
Total 3440 242 721 892 5295
Table 13 Comparison between BT and IRR classifications 1980–2016
BT classification
Fix Peg with par i ty
change
L ow - Vo l .
Float
H i g h -Vo l .
Float
Total
IRR classification:
Peg (1–4) 2662 52 52 41 2807
Crawl (5–8) 1075 110 360 187 1732
Wide moving band/managed float
(9–12)
498 55 348 382 1283
Free float 20 4 26 122 172
Total 4255 221 786 732 5994
IRR freely falling and missing parallel market data omitted
Table 14 Comparison between BT and OST classifications 1980–2014
BT classification
Fix Peg with parity change Low-Vol. Float# High-Vol. Float# Total
OST classification:
JS Peg 2695 66 26 16 2803
Other Peg 656 51 365 75 1147
Single-Year Peg 169 13 22 2 206
Low-Vol. Float# 214 16 202 27 459
High-Vol. Float# 98 109 181 822 1210
Total 3832 255 796 942 5825
#Other than single-year pegs
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Table 15 Comparison between OST and IRR classifications 1980–2014
OST classification
JS Peg Other Peg Single-Year Peg Low-Vol. Float# High-Vol. Float# Total
IRR classification:
Peg (1–4) 2141 95 24 22 51 2333
Crawl (5–8) 364 682 119 174 273 1612
Wide moving
band/managed float
(9–12)
190 330 44 177 429 1170
Free float 3 10 3 21 127 164
1Total 2698 1117 190 394 880 5279
See notes to Tables 13 and 14
Table 16 OST/IMF comparison 1980–2011
OST classification
JS Peg Other Peg Single-Year Peg Low-Vol. Float# High-Vol. Float# Total
IMF classification:
Hard peg 1009 2 0 4 13 1028
Conventional peg 982 57 37 8 83 1167
Basket peg 66 218 36 72 131 523
Band 110 93 19 30 46 298
Crawl 53 189 32 139 165 578
Managed Float 116 305 59 121 387 988
Independent Float 33 152 17 54 313 569
Total 2369 1016 200 428 1138 5151
#Excluding Single-Year Pegs
Table 17 IMF/IRR comparison 1980–2011
IRR classification
Peg (1–4) Crawl (5–8) Wide moving
band/managed float (9–12)
Free float Total
IMF classification:
Hard peg 1023 1 32 0 1056
Conventional peg 745 192 159 8 1104
Basket peg 51 240 189 10 490
Band 97 137 37 19 290
Crawl 43 292 140 0 475
Managed Float 66 508 278 16 868
Independent Float 12 116 262 99 489
Total 2037 1486 1097 152 4772
IRR freely falling and missing parallel market data omitted
Bleaney and Tian
Table 18 Quintiles of the distribution of flexibility indices by exchange rate regime
× 100
20th cent. 40th cent. Median 60th cent. 80th cent.
RMSE
BT Fix 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.439
BT Parity Change 0.000 0.012 0.016 0.022 0.042
BT LV Float 1.098 1.259 1.360 1.474 1.724
BT HV Float 2.203 2.739 3.073 3.681 6.147
IRR Peg 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014
IRR Crawl 0.140 0.416 0.571 0.735 1.332
IRR Man. Float 0.072 0.809 1.169 1.511 2.494
IRR Free Float 0.570 1.521 1.856 2.282 3.551
OST Strict Peg 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.143
OST Other Peg 0.275 0.581 0.760 0.976 1.414
OST Single-Yr Peg 0.163 0.405 0.518 0.625 0.840
OST LV Float 0.445 0.788 0.984 1.177 1.571
OST HV Float 0.130 1.940 2.372 2.814 4.854
IMF Hard Peg 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
IMF Conv. Peg 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.244
IMF Basket Peg 0.120 0.288 0.371 0.481 0.926
IMF Band 0.242 0.494 0.588 0.702 1.074
IMF Crawl 0.108 0.367 0.543 0.743 1.448
IMF Man. Float 0.401 0.884 1.171 1.590 2.792
IMF Indep. Float 0.973 1.630 1.939 2.321 3.720
EVOL
BT Fix 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.234 0.843
BT Parity Change 1.650 2.645 3.323 4.784 19.187
BT LV Float 1.289 1.537 1.677 1.799 2.257
BT HV Float 2.564 3.306 3.820 4.602 9.159
IRR Peg 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.171
IRR Crawl 0.437 0.871 1.096 1.353 2.089
IRR Man. Float 0.818 1.524 1.801 2.118 3.232
IRR Free Float 2.014 2.785 3.038 3.430 4.246
OST Strict Peg 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.248
OST Other Peg 0.775 1.126 1.294 1.463 1.837
OST Single-Yr Peg 0.420 0.654 0.758 0.853 1.124
OST LV Float 1.009 1.374 1.488 1.579 1.794
OST HV Float 2.602 3.326 3.831 4.587 8.541
IMF Hard Peg 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
IMF Conv. Peg 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.725
IMF Basket Peg 0.877 1.334 1.556 1.763 2.639
IMF Band 0.421 0.831 1.001 1.317 1.927
IMF Crawl 0.319 0.838 1.148 1.517 2.876
IMF Man. Float 0.771 1.362 1.740 2.179 3.942
IMF Indep. Float 1.342 2.014 2.414 2.826 4.371
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